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¶1

¶2

¶3

In 2003, two economists at Goldman Sachs produced a white paper predicting the
economic growth of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, collectively termed the BRIC
economies. 1 This paper offered projections from the present date to 2050 relative to
similar growth projections of the G6 countries. 2 Applying capital accumulation and
productivity growth to demographic trends, the authors discovered a surprising result.
Each of the BRIC economics may exceed the gross domestic product (GDP) of the
current members of the G6 within 40 years. 3 China’s economy in size may overtake
those of Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom within ten years. 4 India's may do the
same within 30 years. 5 If the study proves correct, Germany, France, Italy, and the
United Kingdom may all be forced out of the elite G6 club by 2050, leaving only the
United States and Japan remaining within the largest six economies in the world. 6
The Goldman Sachs study should capture the attention of anyone interested in
emerging economies. Although it may not be surprising to everyone that the BRICs will
emerge as economic contenders, what may be unexpected is the rapidity and the totality
with which economic dominance may be achieved. The world that our students live in
now is not the one in which they will grow old, and the United States may stand alone, if
it stands at all, as the sole Western economic leader.
There are of course lies, damn lies, and statistics, 7 and economics has been
frequently and perhaps unjustly painted as the “dismal science.” 8 Any accounting of the
*

Assistant Professor, School of Business, University of Connecticut.
Associate Professor of Business Law, Smeal College of Business, the Pennsylvania State University.
1
Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050 (Goldman Sachs,
Global Economics Paper No. 99, 2003), available at http://www.gs.com/insight/research/reports/99.pdf.
2
Id. at 3. The G6 preceded the G8 as a ‘club of wealthy nations.’ The United States, Japan, Germany,
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom are generally considered to be the G6 members. For more
information on the G8, which includes the G6 plus Canada and Russia, see Profile: G8,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/country_profiles/3777557.stm; G8 Information Centre,
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/.
3
Wilson & Purushothaman, supra note 1, at 4.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 4.
7
Quote... Unquote, The Most Quoted Remarks, http:// www1c.btwebworld.com/quoteunquote/p0000149.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2006) (quoting, MARK TWAIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1924)).
Twain gives credit for the quote to Disraeli. Id.
8
E.g., Mark D. Whitener, Editor’s Note: The Dismal Science, 20 ANTITRUST 6, 6 (2006); David A.
Westbrook, Commentary, Triptych: Three Meditations on How Law Rules After Globalization, 12 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 337, 374 (2003) (“Economics has long been called the ‘dismal science’ for a reason.”);
CHARLES WHELAN, NAKED ECONOMICS: UNDRESSING THE DISMAL SCIENCE (2002). But see Alan
**
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Goldman Sachs paper must be done with caution. The authors rightly note that
demographic shifts, changing investment rates, and different convergence rates can
change the results of the study. 9 Regional economic shocks, political unrest, and a
stalling of needed reforms can derail one or all four of the BRICs from the lofty
attainments of 2050.
Yet far from dismal, Wilson & Purushothaman’s paper is fundamentally optimistic,
at least from the perspective of the BRIC nations. Rigorous quantitative work such as
theirs is badly needed in a profession traditionally focused on qualitative reasoning and
argumentation. 10 Furthermore, few legal articles focus on the BRICs as a collectively
emerging economic force. 11 A 2005 conference held at the University of Connecticut
studying the BRIC economies produced a compendium of BRIC-focused articles written
largely by economists and business faculty. 12 Just as this program thoughtfully explored
the BRICs from a firm perspective, so too should the forward thinking symposium
sponsored by the Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, of which
the articles in this issue are a consequence, similarly illuminate legal issues.
Scholarly machinations aside, the question remains of how scholars should view
the BRIC juggernaut. The BRIC economies are potentially a political and economic
force emerging to unseat Western economic hegemony. On the other hand, the BRICs
may be little more than a collection of disparate nations that share common
characteristics of growth and emergence by chance rather than by design. The answer
likely lies somewhere between these two extremes and legal scholars can help find the
way.
This article briefly examines the converging and diverging economic and legal
trends of the BRICs from an intellectual property perspective. Part I of this article
explores the macroeconomic converging and diverging forces of BRICs, such as growth
opportunities and constraints, transformations and challenges, as well as outward and
inward foreign direct investment. This section will take a particular focus on intellectual
property laws and enforcement as emblematic of the challenges experienced by emerging
BRICs. Part II amplifies the focus on intellectual property with an examination of one of
the most controversial current intellectual property topics–that of pharmaceutical patent
Krupnick, Colloguium, Economic Analysis, 16 PACE ENVT’L L. REV. 69, 69 (1998) (contrasting the notion
of economics as a dismal science, the author writes, “I think of economics as a happy science.”).
9
Wilson & Purushothaman, supra note 1, at 4.
10
See, e.g., Tracy E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law
Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 141 (2006) (“[Empirical research] was uncommon in law schools through most
of the last century.”). See also Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue
Between the Academy and the Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 362 (1995) (reporting results of a
telephone survey of 40 law professors selected at random from 20 schools that nearly 90% thought a “lack
or shortage of empirical research in legal scholarship” existed).
11
Exceptions to this rule predating this symposium are, for example, Robert C. Bird, Defending
Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317 (2006); Michael Littlewood, Tax
Competition: Harmful to Whom?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 411, 478 n.278 (2004) and Srividhya Ragavan, The
Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme Court in Phrma v. Walsh and the TRIPS
Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777, 824 n.279 (2004).
12
EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BRAZIL, RUSSIA,
INDIA AND CHINA (BRICS) (Subhash C. Jain ed. 2003). The conference and the publication by Elgar Press
was hosted and sponsored by the University of Connecticut’s Center for International Business Education
and Research (CIBER), a program funded by the U.S. Department of Education. Id. at v, xv. Other
CIBERs at Columbia University, University of Memphis, Thunderbird, the Galvin School of Management,
and the University of Wisconsin co-sponsored the event. Id. at xiii.
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rights. This section will examine the compulsory licensing statutes and practices of each
BRIC member and draw conclusions from these activities about the differing approaches
of emerging nations to heretofore unfamiliar legal structures and obligations.
I. THE ASCENDANCY OF THE BRICS:
PHYSICAL AND INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL GROWTH AND CHALLENGES
¶7

The BRIC nations emerge from radically different economic and political histories.
Brazil obtained independence from Portugal in 1822 and experienced a surge of
industrialization through much of the twentieth century. In spite of the oil shocks of the
1970s, Brazil’s GDP expanded 8% on average from 1970 to 1980. In the 1980s, Brazil
suffered from low commodity prices, inflationary pressures, and high interest rates while
at the same time making the transition from long-standing military intervention in
governance to mainly civilian leadership. The 1990s and 2000s were marked with widely
fluctuating growth rates, a depreciated currency, and poor administrative reforms. 13
¶8
Russia, by contrast, emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991
with little history of democratic governance and legal free markets. Russian leaders
dismantled the centrally planned economy and distributed ownership of state enterprises
to managers and other citizens. Private property ownership in Russia brought abuses
through dubious loans-for-shares schemes in which powerful citizens “purchased” state
assets from government officials in rigged auctions. The result was the emergence of a
cadre of oligarchs who controlled most of Russia’s most valuable natural resources and
industrial assets. 14
¶9
Achieving independence in 1947, India has existed under democratic government
for centuries. In spite of a diverse economy, India has suffered from a command and
control planning system that has generated large bureaucratic governments, inefficient
production and distribution methods, and a stifling restriction on imports. This policy,
known as the “license raj,” 15 resulted in India’s share of international trade declining
from 2.5% in 1947 to 0.5% in 1980. Weak returns on investments in large, capitalintensive projects arising from delay and cost overruns also contributed to India’s
economic malaise. 16 Increased borrowing and rapid overpopulation has resulted in an
economy poised for growth, but as of yet unable to completely unshackle itself from the
remnants of government planning. 17
¶10
Finally, China has attempted to weave together the economic benefits of a market
economy with the government social and political control of socialism. Forged in 1949,
13

Ben L. Kedia, Somnath Lahiri & Debmalya Mukherjee, BRIC Economies: Earlier Growth
Constraints, Contemporary Transformations and Future Potential, and Key Challenges, 47-48, in
EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA
AND CHINA (BRICS) (Subhash C. Jain ed. 2003). See also Diane M. Sweetwood, Is Brazil’s Economy
Coming Back to Life?, 10 MULTINAT’L BUS. REV. 54 (2002).
14
Daniel J. McCarthy & Sheila M. Puffer, The Tortuous Trail Toward Corporate Governance in Russia
218-220, in EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BRAZIL,
RUSSIA, INDIA AND CHINA (BRICS) (Subhash C. Jain ed. 2003).
15
E.g., Sumit K. Majumdar, The Hidden Hand and the License Raj to an Evaluation of the Relationship
between the Age and the Growth of Firms in India, 19 J. BUS. VENTURING 107 (2004).
16
Jagdish N. Sheth, Making India Globally Competitive, 29 VIKALPA: THE JOURNAL FOR DECISION
MAKERS 1 (2004).
17
Kedia et al., supra note 13, at 51-52.
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the People’s Republic of China has suffered from repeated attempts to jumpstart its
economy. One of the most disastrous was Mao Zedong’s “Great Leap Forward,” a
program of collectivization of agriculture and promotion of small-scale rural industry
that, after initial success, wilted into an economic disaster. Forced production quotas
resulted in goods produced, such as steel, that were useless for market consumption. 18
Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, brought economic reforms by opening China's large
market to foreign investment. 19 Today, China uneasily blends socialist governance and
market planning while continuing its efforts at economic reform.
¶11
In spite of vastly different political histories, the BRIC treatment of intellectual
property law and enforcement are all unsatisfactory, at least by American and perhaps
European standards. All four BRICs have been subjected to coercive pressure from the
United States. The way each nation has responded, however, is as different as the
histories of the nations themselves.
¶12
During the 1980s and at least as far back as 1971, Brazil’s intellectual property law
lacked patent protection for pharmaceutical products and processes. 20
The
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association (PMA) claimed that Brazil’s weak laws
devalued their investments, impaired exports, and denied opportunities for further
investment in Brazil. 21 Claiming hundreds of millions of dollars in losses, the PMA
chose the coercive route, seeking relief under Section 301 22 of the Trade Act of 1974. 23
Section 301 and its subsequent enhancements give the President authority to impose
retaliatory sanctions against a nation that engages in unfair trade practices. 24 Pursuant to
the Act, the PMA filed a petition in 1987 with the United States Trade Representative
18

Id. at 52-53.
Anne M. Wall, Intellectual Property Protection in China: Enforcing Trademark Rights, 17 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 341, 349-51 (2006). Deng’s pragmatism toward economics is captured in his widely-cited
quote from the 1960s, “Whether a cat is black or white makes no difference. As long as it catches mice, it is
a good cat.” H. Stephen Harris, Jr., The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of
the People’s Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 169, 172 (2006).
20
Naomi A. Bass, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical
Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 191, 206-07
(2002).
21
Mohamed Omar Gad, Impact of Multinational Enterprises on Multilateral Rulemaking: The
Pharmaceutical Industry and the TRIPS Uruguay Round Negotiations, 9 NAFTA L. & BUS. REV. AM. 667,
674 (2003).
22
19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2007).
23
The stated purposes of the 1974 Trade Act are:
19

(1) to foster the economic growth of and full employment in the United States and to strengthen economic
relations between the United States and foreign countries through open and nondiscriminatory world trade;
(2) to harmonize, reduce, and eliminate barriers to trade on a basis which assures substantially equivalent
competitive opportunities for the commerce of the United States;
(3) to establish fairness and equity in international trading relations, including reform of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade;
(4) to provide adequate procedures to safeguard American industry and labor against unfair or injurious import
competition, and to assist industries, firm, workers, and communities to adjust to changes in international trade flows;
(5) to open up market opportunities for United States commerce in nonmarket economies; and
(6) to provide fair and reasonable access to products of less developed countries in the United States market.
19 U.S.C. § 2102 (2007).
24

See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the TwentyFirst Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 139 n.37 (2000).
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(USTR), which is required to review whether a foreign country practice constitutes a
barrier to U.S. exports. 25 In 1988, President Reagan placed a 100% tariff on $39 million
dollars worth of Brazilian imports to the United States.26 Only when the Brazilian
government announced that it would draft legislation protecting pharmaceutical products
and processes and that it would ensure a bill would be presented to the Brazilian National
Congress by March 20, 1991, did the U.S. government lift the sanctions. 27
¶13
Russia has also experienced U.S. pressure. In 1995, the USTR placed Russia on its
Watch List in 1995 and then elevated Russia to its Priority Watch List in 1997. 28 While
the U.S. government encouraged Russia to join the Berne Convention in exchange for
preferential trade status, the motion picture industry lobbied the U.S. Congress to
withhold ratification until Russia improved its copyright laws. 29 In November 2006,
Russian and American trade representatives signed a “Side Letter” formally known as the
U.S.-Russia Bilateral Market Access Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights. 30 This
letter was negotiated in the context of Russia’s continuing efforts to accede to the World
Trade Organization (WTO). 31 The letter establishes a binding blueprint for Russia to
improve intellectual property enforcement, strengthen various laws, and fully implement
the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 32 Cited
by the International Intellectual Property Association (IIPA) as having the worst
copyright piracy problem in the world, 33 Russia remains on the USTR’s Priority Watch
List. 34 The IIPA watchdog group recommended earlier this year that Russia remain there
until meaningful progress on intellectual property develops. 35 Furthermore, Russia is a
major beneficiary of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program,
designed to promote the economies of developing countries through the allowance of
25

Id. at 139.
Bass, supra note 20, at 207. Mohamed Omar Gad reports the amount at $40 million. Gad, supra note
21, at 684.
27
Determination to Terminate Increased Duties on Certain Articles from Brazil, 55 Fed. Reg. 27,324
(July 2, 1990).
28
Connie Neigel, Piracy in Russia and China: A Different U.S. Reaction, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
179, 188 (2000). See also Tim Kuik, Piracy in Russia: An Epidemic, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 831 (1999). See
Lianlian Lin, Intellectual Property Protection in China, 27 ACAD. LEGAL STUD. BUS. NAT’L PROC. 203,
205 (1998) (“[The] USTR prepares a list of countries, ranked from ‘priority foreign country,’ a country
with the most egregious IPR problems, to ‘priority watch list,’ and to ‘watch list,’ a country that still
warrant [sic] monitoring.”).
29
Bird, supra note 11, at 328. See also Lana C. Fleishman, The Empire Strikes Back: The Influence of
the United States Motion Picture Industry on Russian Copyright Law, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 189, 215-22
(1993).
30
International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2007 Special 301 Report (Russian Federation), at
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301RUSSIA.pdf. at 115 n.2. [hereinafter IIPA 2007 Russia]
31
Russia is not currently a member of the WTO, having merely observer status. Brigitte Binkert, Why
the Current Global Intellectual Property Framework under TRIPS is not Working, 10 INTELL. PROP. L.
BULL. 143, 162 (2006). For more information in Russia’s efforts to join the WTO, see Accessions: Russian
Federation, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm.
32
U.S.-Russia Bilateral Market Access Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/World_Regions/Europe_Middle_East/Russia_the_NIS/asset_upload_file148_10
011.pdf.
33
IIPA 2007 Russia, supra note 30, at 115.
34
United States Trade Representative, 2007 Priority Watch List, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_Special_301_Review/asse
t_upload_file884_11123.pdf. [hereinafter USTR 2007 Priority Watch List]
35
IIPA 2007 Russia, supra note 30, at 115.
26
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duty-free products. 36 Russia received GSP-linked trade benefits worth $429.8 billion in
2003. 37 The IIPA has recommended that the USTR suspend GSP benefits for Russia, and
the USTR remarked in its 2007 Priority Watch List 38 document that the U.S is “reviewing
Russia’s status as a beneficiary country under the U.S. Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) Program.” 39
¶14
India led the charge against intermixing intellectual property and trade rights in the
1980s, refusing to even discuss the possibility of including patent protection in a General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade agreement (GATT). 40 India’s resistance ended in 1989,
during the same period when India depleted its foreign currency reserves due to an
economic crisis. 41 India sought badly needed assistance from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), an entity heavily influenced by the United States. 42 As a result of its IMF
needs and other potential trade losses with the United States, India ultimately relaxed its
opposition to the TRIPS agreement, a major result of GATT, and acceded to its
provisions. 43 U.S.-based pressure towards India did not end even after it agreed to follow
the obligations of TRIPS. When the Indian government delayed in enacting enabling
legislation, the United States sought redress through the WTO, which can ultimately
authorize trade sanctions by one country against another, to compel India to amend its
insufficiently strong patent legislation. 44 In 2000, pharmaceutical representatives
demanded that the USTR place India on its Priority Watch List. As of 2007, India
remains on the USTR’s Priority Watch List, cited for weak copyright laws, inadequate
enforcement, and slow judicial resolution of criminal actions. 45
¶15
The United States repeatedly has threatened China with economic sanctions for its
failure to protect intellectual property rights. After a 1979 agreement to treat one
another’s patents and trademarks equally failed to protect U.S. intellectual property
rights, 46 the USTR placed China on its first Priority Watch List in 1989. 47 During the
1990s, China would respond to U.S. pressure by enacting ever stronger intellectual
property laws. When U.S. firms found these laws or their enforcement unsatisfying, they

36

Michael Mertens, Thieves in Cyberspace: Examining Music Piracy and Copyright Law Deficiencies
in Russia as it Enters the Digital Age, 14 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 139, 179 n.308 (2006)
(describing GSP program). See also United States Trade Representative: Generalized System of
Preferences, at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Development/Preference_Programs/GSP/Section_Index.html.
37
Mertens, supra note 36, at 180.
38
IIPA 2007 Russia, supra note 30, at 115.
39
USTR 2007 Priority Watch List, supra note 34, at 8. See also Mertens, supra note 36, at 180
(recommending that “[t]he United States should immediately suspend Russia's GSP benefits until the
country recognizes the online piracy problem and enforces copyright protection to the extent that a
noticeable reduction in piracy results.”).
40
C. O’Neal Taylor, Linkage and Rule-Making: Observations on Trade and Investment and Trade and
Labor, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 639, 668 n.114 (1998).
41
George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent Protection: The U.S. and
India in the Uruguay Round and its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J. INT’L & FOREIGN AFF. 283, 316 (1998).
42
Id.
43
Id. at 317.
44
Bird, supra note 11, at 345.
45
USTR 2007 Priority Watch List, supra note 34, at 10.
46
Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of
China of 1979, July 7, 1979, P.R.C.-U.S., 31 U.S.T. 4652.
47
David Hindman, The Effect of Intellectual Property Regimes on Foreign Investments in Developing
Countries, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467, 485 (2006).
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would lobby the U.S. government to impose sanctions. 48 A last minute compromise
between American and Chinese negotiators would avert a trade war and satisfy public
opinion. But, as interest in piracy inevitably waned after the highly publicized
agreement, American companies in China sensitive to intellectual property concerns
would again demand assistance from the government to aid them in protecting their
intellectual property rights abroad. 49 The result has been a frustrating “China Cycle” of
negotiation, agreement, and renegotiation that has continued for over a decade. 50 As of
2007, China remains on the USTR’s Priority Watch List. 51
¶16
In spite of current problems, the United States has succeeded at least in part in
improving the protection of intellectual property rights in the BRICs over the past 20
years. All four BRICs relented somewhat under U.S. pressure to pass new laws and
improve enforcement. The BRICs, however, are not simply compliant states. Each
BRIC nation has developed its own successful strategy for resisting the unfettered will of
the United States.
¶17
Of the four BRICs, Brazil has been by far the most masterful in counteracting the
economic and political influence of the United States over global intellectual property
law. In 1997, Brazil enacted new legislation that included a “local working” requirement
which subjects a patent owner to potential compulsory licensing within three years after
the patent is granted if, among other reasons, the patent owner fails to manufacture the
product within Brazilian territory. 52 The new law lowered production costs on critical
drugs due to the increased local production.53 The law also improved Brazil’s ability to
develop local manufacturing capacity and expertise to certain manufacture drugs once
their patents have expired. 54
¶18
The American pharmaceutical industry responded by predicting that Brazil’s
actions would undermine efforts to develop new and improved treatments for important
public health problems such as suppression of the HIV virus. 55 If the Brazilian
government issued a compulsory license breaking these critical patents, the industry said
it will “ensure that companies whose patents are broken will not be selling their next
generation AIDS drugs, or any other medication for that matter, in Brazil.” 56 The United
States also responded bringing a complaint against Brazil before the WTO, arguing that
Article 68 contravened Article 27(1) of TRIPS, which prohibits national patent protection
laws from discriminating with regard to the locale of invention. 57 According to the
48

Bird, supra note 11, at 342.
Id.
50
Id. See also Yu, supra 24, at 134-35.
51
USTR 2007 Priority Watch List, supra note 34, at 1-6.
52
Id. The patent owner will be allowed to import the drug if the owner can show “economic
unfeasibility” of manufacturing the medicine in Brazil. Id.
53
Ubirajara Regis Quintanilha Marques et al., Brazil’s AIDS Controversy: Antiretroviral Drugs,
Breaking Patents, and Compulsory Licensing, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 471, 474 (2005).
54
Claudia Schulz, The TRIPS Agreement and Intellectual Property in Brazil, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 100, 101 (2004). The Article has been credited with reducing prices of key anti-retroviral AIDS
drugs Efavirenz and Indinavir by 64% and 77%, respectively. Carlos Passarelli & Veriano Terto, Jr., Good
Medicine: Brazil’s Multifront war on AIDS, 35 NACLA REP. ON AMERICAS 35, 37 (2002).
55
Marques, supra note 53, at 476.
56
Id. (quoting Institute for Policy Innovation, Necessity Breeds Invention (Protection), Techbytes 2.14
(Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://www.iipi.org).
57
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Brazil--Measure Affecting Patent Protection--Request for
49
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USTR’s Special 301 report in 2001, Brazil’s claim that impairment of Article 68 would
threaten its anti-AIDS program was inaccurate because Brazilian law already allowed for
compulsory licenses for national emergencies, such as AIDS-prevention under Article
71. 58 The USTR called Article 68 a hidden trade barrier because it could require
licensing “for any patented product, from bicycles to automobile components to golf
clubs . . . [and is] discriminating against all imported products in favor of locally
produced products.” 59 The USTR further characterized Article 68 “a protectionist
measure intended to create jobs for Brazilian nationals.”60
¶19
Instead of quietly defending Article 68 on the merits before the WTO, Brazil pled
its case before the court of public opinion. Although Article 68 granted a compulsory
license to any good regardless of social importance, Brazil tied Article 68 to the deeply
controversial AIDS debate raging between developing countries and pharmaceutical
enterprises. During this period, 39 pharmaceutical firms were suing the South African
government to stop it from importing generic versions of anti-retroviral drugs that were
patented in South Africa. 61 The ill-targeted lawsuit, which triggered a proliferation of
global activism and significant damage to public opinion, was filed against a nation
where 20% of South Africa's adult population, or 4.2 million people, were believed to be
infected with the HIV virus. 62 Brazil used South Africa as a comparison point to parade
its highly successful anti-AIDS program, implying that this program would be in
jeopardy if the United States succeeded before the WTO. 63 AIDS activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) accused the U.S. government of profiting at the
expense of infected Brazilians and commenced a signature campaign. 64 Brazil hosted a
global meeting of NGO representatives and organized a march on the U.S. consulate to
protest the complaint, with similar demonstrations occurring in other Brazilian cities.65
Brazil successfully lobbied for a United Nations Commission on Human Rights
resolution affirming the right of access to medication. 66 The United States was the sole
abstention of the 53 member body, every member of which voted to pass the resolution. 67
¶20
Not satisfied with what one commentator called a “public relations disaster” 68 for
the United States, Brazil went on the offensive by filing its own complaint before the
WTO challenging portions of the U.S. patent code as non-compliant with TRIPS. 69
Consultations by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/1 (June 8, 2000).
58
United States Trade Representative, 2000 Special 301 Report, available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/ustr/special301.pdf. [hereinafter 2001 Special 301 Report]
59
Id. See also Haochen Sun, The Road to Doha and Beyond: Some Reflections on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 123, 132-33 (2004).
60
2001 Special 301 Report, supra note 34.
61
Passarelli & Terto, supra note 54 at 41.
62
Sabin Russell, AIDS Experts to Meet in Eye of Epidemic/20% of South Africa’s Adults are Infected,
S.F. CHRON., Jul. 7, 2000, available at, http://www.aegis.com/news/sc/2000/SC000701.html.
63
Anselm Kamperman Sanders, The Development Agenda for Intellectual Property: Rational Human
Policy or “Modern-Day Communism”?, lecture presented at Universiteit Maastricht (May 20, 2005),
available at http://www.unimaas.nl/bestand.asp?id=3827, at 16. See also Marques, supra note __, at 471.
64
Chakravarthi Raghavan, US beats a (tactical) retreat over Brazil’s patent law, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/tactical.htm.
65
Passarelli & Terto, supra note 54, at 41-42.
66
Sanders, supra note 63, at 16.
67
Id.
68
Raghavan, supra note 64.
69
Sue Ann Mota, TRIPS: Ten Years of Disputes at the WTO, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. 455, 477
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Brazil challenged 30 U.S.C § 202, which stated that products arising from small business
or non-profit patent rights in inventions made with federal assistance shall be made
substantially in the United States. 70 This provision also stated that licenses arising from
federally-owned inventions shall be manufactured in the United States. 71 India even
joined the fray, claiming that it had a “systemic interest” in the proceeding. 72 The
combined pressure from Brazilian leadership, Brazil’s reprisal WTO action, and NGOs
forced the United Sates to withdraw its original complaint from the WTO. 73
¶21
Russia, by contrast, does not press its advantage in the court of public opinion, but
rather, resists United States pressure because of its unique political position as a nuclear
nation, member of the U.N. Security Council, and a former superpower. In the past,
Russia’s lack of intellectual property protection had been dealt with relatively leniently
by the United States as compared to Brazil, India, and China. This may be due to the
unique position that Russia held during the 1990s. In the post-Soviet era, the United
States emerged as a strong supporter of the Yeltsin government. 74 Government officials
speculated that pressing Russia for stronger intellectual property protection would
unnecessarily push the Russian government back towards strong state controls if its
economy faltered. 75 In addition, Russia has never been traditionally viewed as the
enormous consumer market that has attracted businesspeople to China, India, and to a
lesser extent, Brazil. 76 Most recently, Russia has played a key role in the global political
arena on such controversial issues as the U.S. war in Iraq, dissemination of nuclear
technologies, and terrorism. Current and future U.S. political administrations may not
want to antagonize Russia unnecessarily, and Russia’s desired entry into the WTO may
be one of only places where the United States may be able to exert meaningful leverage. 77
¶22
As a result, Russia’s political importance has allowed it to avoid making the
necessary changes in its political, judicial, and law enforcement systems to halt piracy.
Russia has no single agency responsible for IPR enforcement, nor a single policymaker in
charge of creating or enforcing intellectual property policy. 78 Enforcement powers are
scattered amongst many government agencies, with one entity having authority over plant

(2005).
70
30 U.S.C. § 202 (2007). See also Mota, supra note 69, at 477.
71
30 U.S.C. § 202 (2007). See also Mota, supra note 69, at 477.
72
WTO Request to Join Consultations, U.S. – U.S. Patents Code, WT/DS2124/2 (Feb. 16, 2001),
available at, http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/224-2.doc.
73
Terrence M. Brennan, The United States and Brazil Agree to Disagree over Brazil’s Patent Law, 13
INT. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (2001).
74
See, e.g., Philip Zelikow, Beyond Boris Yeltsin, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 44 (1994).
75
Neigel, supra note 28, at 197.
76
In 2006, combined imports and exports for Brazil, China, and India exceed those of Russia. See
United States International Trade Commission: U.S. Trade Balance, by Partner Country 2006, at
http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/cy_m3_run.asp.
77
See, e.g., Fred Weir, US-Russia Rift Widening, Despite Pact, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Nov. 21, 2006,
available at, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1121/p06s02-woeu.html (quoting Viktor Kremeniuk, deputy
director of the Institute of USA-Canada Studies in Moscow as stating, “The only thing that has prevented a
full slide into a new cold war was the personal relationship between Bush and Putin. . . . Now, as a result of
an election that has greatly weakened Bush, he is reaching out to Putin for help on foreign policy issues
such as Iran, using the only carrot he has: WTO membership.”).
78
IIPA 2007 Russia, supra note 30, at 132.
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licensing and another over copyright policy. 79 A working government commission to
address intellectual property problems excludes rights holders from participation. 80
¶23
In a nation where copyright piracy ranks second to none in the world, Russian
authorities have finally commenced raids against illegal optical disc plants. 81 These
raids, however, are rarely executed by surprise and often undertaken without the
cooperation of the copyright holders of the pirated materials. 82 The result has been that
almost all of the optical disc plants raided over the last three years remain in operation. 83
Furthermore, Russian authorities are apparently not above outright chicanery to hide the
extent of piracy. The IIPA reports that when a U.S. government official met Russian
government officials in Moscow in late January 2007, all pirated products disappeared
from the store and market shelves or stores were closed. 84 On February 5, after the U.S.
delegation departed, pirated goods miraculously returned to these establishments. 85 The
Russian government has the resources to suppress piracy, but the lack of strong
incentives or impending sanctions gives it little reason to do so.
¶24
India lacks the economic power of China and the political importance of Russia in
the eyes of the United States. That does not leave India, however, without an intellectual
property resistance strategy. Although India has made significant strides in improving
intellectual property rights, it has done so only at the slowest possible speed. Once India
formally agreed to adopt TRIPS and its associated intellectual property requirements, it
moved toward compliance at a glacial pace. Even then, a number of Indian lawmakers
still resisted implementing TRIPS. 86 For example, TRIPS Article 70.8(a) required India
to establish a patent office for receiving submissions for inventions. 87 Yet, a “procedural
mishandling” enabling legislation caused the Indian Parliament to fail to adopt the
necessary statutes to establish the patent office within the necessary time. 88
¶25
The United States responded by opening an investigation into India’s failure to
effectively patent and by filing a formal claim with the WTO. 89 The WTO Dispute
Settlement Body concluded that India failed to comply with TRIPS, and India
unsuccessfully appealed. 90 A March 2, 1998 deadline for India to comply came and
went. 91 After three extensions granted by the United States, India and the U.S. finally
agreed to a new April, 1999 deadline to implement the necessary legislation. 92 By
March, 1999, India’s legislature finally managed to pass an “emergency measure”
79

Id. at 124.
Id. at 132.
81
IIPA 2007 Russia, supra note 30, at 122.
82
Id. at 116.
83
Id. at 123.
84
Id. at 126.
85
Id.
86
See N. Vasuki Rao, Anti-piracy Conference Turns, Instead, Anti-U.S., J. COMMERCE, Nov. 15, 1996,
at 5A.
87
David K. Tomar, Note, A Look Into the WTO Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute between the United
States and India, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 579, 585 (1999).
88
Bird, supra note 11, at 345.
89
Tomar, supra note 87, at 585.
90
See Report of the Appellate Body, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
91
Tomar, supra note 87, at 589.
92
Bird, supra note 11, at 346.
80
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complying with TRIPS while the backlog of unprocessed patent applications exceeded
30,000. 93
¶26
Drug firm representatives pressed the USTR again to place India on the Priority
Foreign Country list in February, 2000. 94 Apparently anticipating this pressure, India
introduced a new patents bill in 1999, but it was eventually shuttled away to a legislative
committee pending further review. 95 Another patent bill emerged again in 2002, but was
drafted to allow India to grant a compulsory license for patented drugs in a national
emergency. 96 In March 2005, over five years after U.S. applied direct pressure upon
India to act, India finally enacted a patent law sufficiently protecting software,
agricultural, and pharmaceutical products. 97
¶27
India’s procedural slowness is not limited to patent infringement. India has also
been slow to enact optical disc regulations that would license factories, grant authority to
conduct surprise inspections, and gather sample discs for forensic testing to prevent
piracy. 98 Legislation implementing these regulations has been under discussion for over
three years with no immediate sign of passage. 99 Amendments necessary to harmonize
existing copyright law with leading treaties have made no progress, even with many years
of discussion by a “core group” in the Ministry of Human Resources Development and
the release of a draft in early 2006 seeking public comment. 100 There appears to be little
sign of Indian procedural efficiency increasing anytime in the future.
¶28
The Chinese government, while no doubt able to manipulate global public opinion
like Brazil or drag its legislative heels like India, has been the most direct of all when
faced with pressure to conform from the United States. In 1988, the USTR placed China
on its Priority Watch List and China reacted with improvements to its intellectual
property laws. 101 In 1991, when dissatisfaction from American business generated even
closer scrutiny of China’s intellectual property practices, the U.S. government threatened
to impose $1.5 billion in tariffs on a variety of Chinese goods. 102 China, by now a
robustly growing economic power, simply threatened retaliation with its own tariffs on
American aircraft, chemicals, corn, cotton, and steel. 103 After lengthy negotiations, China
and the United States reached a Memorandum of Understanding in January 1992 (1992
MOU), narrowly averting a costly trade war. 104

93

Id.
Press Release, PhRMA, PhRMA Calls for Vigillance [sic] on Intellectual Property Protection;
Recommends Argentina, Egypt and India as “Priority Foreign Countries”,
http://www.pharma.org/mediaroom/press/releases///21.02.2000.20.cfm (Feb. 21, 2000).
95
Srividhya Ragavan, Can’t we All Get Along? The Case for a Workable Patent Model, 35 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 117, 148 (2003).
96
Id. at 148 & n.312.
97
Patents Bill: Govt takes Left on board, BUSINESS STANDARD, Mar. 19, 2005, at 1.(available at 2005
WLNR 4249411)
98
International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2007 Special 301 Report (India), at
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301INDIA.pdf, at 49. [hereinafter IIPA 2007 India]
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Bird, supra note 11, at 340; Yu, supra note 24, at 140-41.
102
Yu, supra note 24, at 141-42.
103
Id. at 142.
104
Paul C.B. Liu, U.S. Industry’s Influence on Intellectual Property Negotiations and Special 301
Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87, 112 (1994).
94
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¶29

After the 1992 MOU, China significantly improved its intellectual property laws
and joined the Berne and Geneva Conventions in 1993. 105 Yet, in 1994 the United States
again cited China’s lack of commitment to intellectual property protection and threatened
to impose tariffs. 106 Not surprisingly, China threatened its own tariffs against the United
States. 107 Again, a last minute compromise between the nations averted a trade war.
¶30
This repeating process of threat, counter-threat, negotiation, and last-minute
resolution has been rightfully characterized by Peter Yu as a “cycle of futility.” 108 The
cycle continued throughout the 1990s as threatened tariffs by the United States for failure
to protect intellectual property met with threats of equally damaging Chinese countertariffs against U.S. products. The cycle halted because of China’s accession to the WTO
on December 11, 2001. 109 China’s membership in the WTO requires the United States to
resolve any trade disputes with China, as with any WTO member country, through the
mandatory WTO settlement process. 110 This does not mean, however, that American
businesses will not lobby to use the WTO as a forum to improve intellectual property
protection. In 2005, trade groups urged the United States to file a complaint against
China before the WTO because of inadequate intellectual property protection. 111 In
September, 2007, the WTO opened a formal investigation into U.S. allegations that China
is insufficiently protecting intellectual property rights.112 Pressure from the United States
on non-intellectual property trade-related issues continues to result in threatened countersanctions from the Chinese government. 113
II. THE FUTURE OF THE BRICS: CONVERGENCE AND RESISTANCE
¶31

As the history described above indicates, the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights in the BRIC countries has been the product of starts and stops,
and the journey is clearly far from over. Much contention likely lies ahead as intellectual
property continues to increase in economic significance. 114 It is tempting to view the
BRIC’s options for the future from one of two opposing perspectives: (1) the Western
property rights view, which argues for strong legal protections and the rejection of freeriding when a country has the economic strength to participate in global innovation, or
(2) the Southern open access view, calling for a noble resistance to the coercion of
105

Warren Newberry, Note, Copyright Reform in China: A “TRIPS” Much Shorter and Less Strange
than Imagined?, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1439 (2003).
106
Yu, supra note 24, at 144.
107
Id.
108
Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO
China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 904 (2006) (citing Yu, supra note 24, at 140-48).
109
Id. at 904 n.16.
110
Id. at 904.
111
Id.
112
WTO Inquiry to Examine Counterfeiting in China, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 26, 2007), available at,
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB119071094229538578-lMyQjAxMDE3OTIwNTcyMTUwWj.html.
113
Yu, supra note 108, at 902.
114
See Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic Analysis,
22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 735 (2007) (stating that “much of the value of the world's leading companies
resides in their portfolios of intangible assets” and citing several sources in support). According to the
Wall Street Journal, intangible assets, including patents, account for nearly one-third of the value of all U.S.
stocks, or 45% of GDP. Nick Timiraos, Businesses Battle Over Patent Laws, WALL ST. J., Jun. 9, 2007, at
A7.
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industrialized oppressors intent on maximizing profits without a realistic understanding
of development needs. As noted, each variant of the narrative has support. On one
hand, the BRICs seem to respond to the economic incentive to limit intellectual property
enforcement when home industries can effectively copy the creativity and technology of
industrialized nations. 115 Conversely, the property rights push can seem a bit
disingenuous in view of the fact that many western nations owe aspects of their economic
development to a lack of intellectual property protection. 116 As a result, nations often end
up talking past each other or resorting to grudging conciliation without truly
understanding the others’ needs.
¶32
Perhaps the dichotomous narrative is simply wrong on both counts. One can argue
that it misses a middle ground that may better characterize the optimal future relationship
of the BRICs with developed countries, as well as the larger developing world. It is
possible that a hybrid model of intellectual property protection and occasional
exception—a process of convergence and resistance—will provide the mix necessary for
developing countries to gain an economic foothold, protect the health and safety of their
citizens, and play a responsible and vital role in the world economy. This model may not
mimic the regimes of industrialized nations now, or event in the distant future. But it
may provide a predictable projection the value of investment incentives in these growing
global markets.
¶33
In assessing the future of BRIC intellectual property regimes, most commentators
choose to focus on copyright and trademark piracy. Indeed, as described above, it is the
area that is subject to most scrutiny and is easily followed as a measure of progress.
However, other areas of intellectual property protection have broader significance to most
industries and may provide a more significant economic yardstick. In particular, patents
are the cornerstone of industrial innovation investment, 117 and a country’s willingness to
provide substantial protection can provide a reasonable basis for assessing its
commitment to property rights and other investment incentives. For that reason, these

115

For example, India’s strength in generic pharmaceutical manufacturing has arguably pushed it
toward more relaxed intellectual property protection over the pharmaceutical innovations of foreign
companies. See Rishi Gupta, TRIPS Compliance: Dealing with the Consequences of Drug Patents in India,
26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 599, 602–03 (2003). Conversely, this ability to copy the inventions of foreign
companies is one of the classical rationales for intellectual property protection. See Peter K. Yu,
Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, Res. Paper No. 04-23, at pp. 4-5
(2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=978301.
116
See FATUMTA JAWARA & AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL WORLD OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 36 (2004) (“The USA, Germany, Japan and Korea, for example, all
industrialized largely by copying existing product and/or process technologies . . ..”).
117
SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 11-14 (2004) (describing the central role of
patents in the great innovations of the late 19th and 20th centuries).. This is particular true in industries like
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. Stephen G. Kunin et al., Reach-Through Claims in the Age of
Biotechnology, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 609, 615 (2002). One would be remiss in overlooking the important
contribution of trade secret protection as an important investment mechanism as well. Trade secrets are the
flip side of patents, providing protection when the costs of public disclosure exceed the gains of monopoly.
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 326–29 (2003) (describing three economic justifications for the patent system based on inventor
incentives and alternate behavior if only trade secret protections existed); Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi
Alberto Franzoni, The Contract Theory of Patents, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 365 (2004) (analyzing patent
economics by considering trade secrets as the alternative). However, such protections are by definition,
less transparent than patents, and therefore less useful as a means of assessment.
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“hard” IP assets merit substantive investigation in any discussion of BRIC intellectual
property regimes. 118
A. Pharmaceutical Patents as an IP Bellwether
¶34

Pharmaceuticals are the basis of treatment for a wide variety of public health
problems from recent global pandemics like AIDS, 119 to diseases like malaria that have
dogged mankind for millennia. 120 A great deal of investment is required to bring a
pharmaceutical to market, 121 much of it tied up in research endeavors that never come to
fruition for a variety of reasons. 122 The most common drugs today are known as “small
molecule” compounds, meaning that they have a relatively simple structure that can be
easily understood by a skilled chemist. 123 In contrast, in the emerging science of
biotechnology, the structure of treatment compounds is often so complex that it eludes
easy characterization. 124 The current dependence on small-molecule pharmaceuticals is
significant because, without strong protection, they are relatively easy to copy by third
parties, even without the use of a company’s inside know-how. 125 This means that,
without a powerful legal mechanism to protect the investment from competition, it is
likely to be erased by free riders. 126
¶35
Patent rights—which are a form of property protection127 —provide the primary
exclusion mechanism for pharmaceuticals. They can cover several aspects of a drug,
including the actual compound, the method of treatment, the method of manufacture, the
formulation, or any combination. 128 It has been demonstrated that the pharmaceutical
118

Intellectual property attorneys often refer to patents as “hard IP,” and trade secrets, copyrights and
trademarks as “soft IP.” See Marc E. Hankin, Comment, Now that we Know “the Way Forward,” Let us
Stay the Course, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1299 (2002).
119
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (“UNDP”), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, at
3 (2005), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_HDI.pdf (“the HIV/AIDS
pandemic has inflicted the single greatest reversal in human development.”).
120
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND
PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH: INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 2-3 (2006).
121
See Joseph DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J.
HEALTH ECON. 151, 166–68, 180 (2003).
122
Henry Grabowski, Politics, Policy and Availability: Patent and New Product Development in the
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Industry, 8 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 7, 9 (2003) (“most new drug
candidates fail to reach the market.”).
123
Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended Admission the Biotech
Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 60 (2006) (“Small molecule drugs are relatively easy to
copy and test for equivalence.”).
124
Id. at 61.
125
Patricia M. Festin, The Regulatory, Economic, and Privacy Implications of Pharmacogenomics, 10
VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 12 (2005).
126
Id.
127
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (patents have the attributes of personal property under U.S. law); General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Preamble,
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81, 84 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (“[r]ecognizing that intellectual property rights
are private rights”). The essential element of a patent right is that it confers upon its owner the right to
exclude others from practicing the invention. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND
WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 70 (1969) (patents create incentives
by conferring monopoly power for a limited period of time). The patent right can also be sold or licensed
like a tangible property right.
128
Stephanie Greene, A Prescription for Change: How the Medicare Act Revises Hatch-Waxman to
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industry responds positively to patent protection, much more so than do other
industries. 129 Investment in research and development really does appear to track
substantive protection for pharmaceutical patents.
¶36
On the other hand, the information embodied in valuable medicines presents a
tempting target for acquisition. From a social perspective, the desire to increase access to
all those in need may conflict with the pricing or distribution plans of the property
owner. 130 From an economic perspective, the ability to reap local profits from high-cost
innovation produced in other nations may lead to an equally strong desire to limit
property protection. 131 In both cases, the countervailing forces to intellectual property
incentives present a classic test of commitment to industrialized nation ideals for the
BRICs. They provide a useful lens for predicting the high technology future of these
nations.
B. Recent Progress Toward Basic Protection
¶37

It may not come as a complete surprise that the BRICs as a group have only
recently included substantive patent protection for pharmaceutical compounds. But this
fact glosses over the historical complexity of patent rights in this area and suggests the
existence of opportunism on the part of the BRICs that is inaccurate. In the first place,
the fact that a nation should confer patent protection to a pharmaceutical was not a
foregone conclusion before the TRIPS agreement. In fact, at the time the language was
settled, over 50 countries (including many industrialized nations) did not provide patent
protection for pharmaceuticals. 132 The reasons were varied, including narrow subject
matter provisions as well as public health policy. Secondly, it is undeniable that the
BRICs have made significant efforts to adopt TRIPS compliant–some would say,
Western–patent rights for pharmaceuticals; the playing field is much more level today
than it was only 15 years ago.
¶38
India provides perhaps the most interesting case of transitioning patent protection.
Its lack of pharmaceutical patent protection leading up to TRIPS was actually the result
Speed Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L. 309, 316 n.30 (2005)
129
See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 174–
75 (1986). See also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 4–14 (2003) (“Representatives from the pharmaceutical
industry stated that patent protection is indispensable in promoting pharmaceutical innovation for drug
products containing new chemical entities.”).
130
Multinational companies often engage in open price discrimination, wherein goods are sold at
different prices in across the globe, based not on differences in production or distribution costs, but on the
maximum price that can be obtained in different markets. Patricia Danzon & Adrian Towse, Differential
Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D and Patents, 3 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON.
183, 201–02 (2003).
131
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
132
Kelley A. Friedgen, Rethinking the Struggle Between Health & Intellectual Property: A Proposed
Framework for Dynamic, Rather that Absolute, Patent Protection of Essential Medicines, 16 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 689 696-97 (2002). A very interesting discussion by Julio Nogués notes how recent
pharmaceutical patent protection is many of the world’s most economically powerful countries. Julio
Nogués, Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs, World Bank Working Paper PS 502, at pp. 3-4 (1990),
available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1990/09/01/000009265_3960929170142/Render
ed/PDF/multi0page.pdf (stating that pharmaceutical patents have only been available in Germany since
1968, Italy since 1978, Japan since 1976, Sweden since 1978 and Switzerland since 1977).
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of a change in the law in the 1970s. Prior to that time, owing to its colonial lineage to
Britain, India did provide patent protection to both pharmaceutical compounds and
methods for manufacture. 133 However, the 1970 revisions to the Indian Patent Act
removed protection for compounds. 134 The rationale was entirely practical—India
determined that foreign investment in its domestic pharmaceutical industry was lacking,
and local drug development was unlikely to occur in the near future. 135 The country
could do far better by fostering the growth of a local generic industry founded on the
production of drugs created in Western nations. This move was extremely successful
from the standpoint of industrial development. India’s generic drug industry is now one
of the most robust in the world. The fact that this growth was underpinned on the unrecouped investment of developed nations did not escape the TRIPS negotiators, and
countries like India were expected to include compound protection as a consequence of
membership. 136 A transition period was instituted that allowed developing countries time
to create such protection. 137 That period ended for India in 2005, when it formally
introduced patent rights for pharmaceutical compounds. 138
¶39
As described above, Brazil’s pattern of pharmaceutical protection is similar to
India’s but without the early post-colonial period of patent protection. Brazil added
pharmaceutical compound protection in 1997. 139 The revised law now complies with
TRIPS, at least in regard to subject-matter protection. Very soon after, in 1999, Brazil
instituted a formal system for the approval of generic pharmaceuticals. 140 These
provisions have ensured that Brazil has a strong domestic manufacturing industry, though
it has been suggested it would be stronger if the government’s public stance on IP were
more favorable to innovation. 141
¶40
On the other hand, as a communist nation, China did not provide private ownership
of patents on pharmaceuticals. 142 The first break in the barrier to invention rights came in
133

Samira Guennif & Julien Chaisse, Present Stakes Around Patent Political Economy: Legal and
Economic Lessons from the Pharmaceutical Patent Rights in India, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 65, 69 (2007).
134
Id. at 69-70.
135
Id.
136
See TRIPS, supra note 127, at art. 27 (requiring that patents be available in all areas of technology,
with a few specific exceptions such as multicelled plants and animals and medical methods for the
treatment of humans or animals).
137
Id. at arts. 65 & 70.8; Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 863
(2007).
138
The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, available at
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.PDF. The transition was not entirely smooth. In 1996,
the United States filed a dispute against India in the WTO, alleging that India failed to provide the
necessary interim protection for existing pharmaceutical compounds. Panel Report, India-Patent Protection
for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997).
139
Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O., 15/05/1996 (93, 1): 8353, 15.05.1996, translation
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/brazil1.html,; Marques, supra note 53, at 473.
140
Lei No. 9.787, de 10 de fevereiro de 1999. See Vera Valente, Generics in Latin America: An
Analysis of the Brazilian Experience, 4 J. GENERIC MEDS. 30, 31 (2006).
141
See, e.g., Lawrence A .Kogan, Brazil’s IP Opportunism Threatens U.S. Private Property Rights, 38
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2006) (suggesting that, due to the Brazilian government’s anti-IP
policies, European investment in research and development is shifting to the United States).
142
Averie K. Hason & Jean E. Shimotake, Recent Development in Patent Rights for Pharmaceuticals in
China and India, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 303, 305 (2006) (noting that China had a form of patent protection
dating from the 1950s, but ownership resided in the state); Jeffrey A. Andrews, Pfizer’s Viagra Patent and
the Promise of Patent Protection in China, 28 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 6 n.20 (2006)
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1984, when China agreed to establish a basic patent system. 143 However, like India a
decade and a half before, rights were extended only to processes, not compounds. 144 It
wasn’t until the 1992 MOU that China agreed to extend protection to pharmaceutical
compounds. 145 Interestingly, a regulatory procedure existed under China’s Drug
Administration Law, which protected any pharmaceutical product that had not been
previously manufactured in China as a new drug. 146 Because foreign sales were not
included under the original provision, local manufacturers could copy foreign drugs and
sell them with exclusivity, even as against the company that originally developed the
drug. 147
¶41
Owing to its communist past, Russia, like China, also did not have a system for
protecting intellectual property rights. 148 However, patent rights were protected prior to
the communist revolution. 149 Whether this has smoothed the way toward a modern
intellectual property system is open to question. At any rate, since the fall of the Soviet
Union, Russia has instituted modern patent property rights with individual ownership. 150
As part of this system, Russia currently protects pharmaceutical patents, though it offers
an interesting enforcement exception to pharmacies in making prescriptive
preparations. 151
¶42
Thus, despite divergent pasts, the BRICs are generally on the same page today
when it comes to the protections afforded pharmaceuticals. Of course, granting the rights
on paper is only the first step. All of the BRICs have faced difficulties in convincing
developed countries that their respective pharmaceutical granting and enforcement
regime are reasonably rigorous and unbiased. This has led to accusations that the rights
are but a first step, contingent on a serious follow-through yet to be seen. 152 Incidents
143
Hason & Shimotake, supra note 142, at 305 (citing Patent Law of the People's Republic of China
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Sixth Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1,
1984) (P.R.C.)); Andrews, supra note 142, at 6.
144
Id. (stating that “pharmaceutical products and substances obtained by means of a chemical process”
was one of the areas excepted from patentability).
145
Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the People's Republic of
China (1992), TIAS No 12,036; Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor is Far Away: China’s Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights Protection, 1986-2006, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231, 235 (2006).
146
Eliza Yibing Zhou, Chinese Biogenerics and Protection of IP, GENETIC ENG’G & BIOTECHNOLOGY
NEWS, Sep. 1, 2006, at 58, available at http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem.aspx?aid=1875.
147
Id.
148
Sergey Budylin & Yulia Osipova, Total Upgrade: Intellectual Property Reform in Russia, 1 COLUM.
J. E. EUR. L. 1, 4 (2007); Mariyetta Meyers, Russia and the Internet: Russia’s Need to Confront and
Conquer Trademark Infringement in Domain Names and Elsewhere on the Web, 9 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 200,
204 (2006).
149
Meyers, supra note 144, at 204 n.10; Julian Zegelman, Features — Researching Intellectual
Property Law in the Russian Federation (Aug. 19, 2005), http://www.llrx.com/features/russiaiplaw.htm.
150
Marina Portnova, Ownership and Enforcement of Patent Rights in Russia: Protecting an Invention
in the Existing Environment, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 505, 511-12 (1998). Russia also grants patents
as a member of the Eurasian Patent Organization, along with many of the formal Soviet republics.
SeeHugh Brett, Origins and Activities of the Eurasian Patent Organization (May 2004),
http://scientific.thomson.com/free/ipmatters/patof/8224240/.
151
Patentnyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Patent Law of the Russian Federation] No. 3517-1, Sept. 23,
1992, 42 VSND i VS RF No. 42, item 2139 (1992), amended by Federal Law No. 22-FZ, Feb. 7, 2003, at
art. 11, translation available at http://www.fips.ru/ruptoen2/law/patent_law.htm (Russia) (Acts not
recognized as infringements on the Exclusive Right of the Patent Owner).
152
See, e.g., Asia Market Survey: IP Issues for Rights Owners, ASIALAW, Apr. 1, 2007, at 1 (“Despite
considerable improvements to the legislative environment in several key jurisdictions in Asia, particularly
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have included somewhat expected variants on pharmaceutical counterfeiting in China,153
Russia, 154 and Brazil. 155 However, the most prominent disputes that epitomize the
complexity of the issues come from India and China.
¶43
With the introduction of its pharmaceutical product patent regime in 2005, India
sought to delineate between groundbreaking invention and obvious extension of known
compounds. 156 At first glance, this seems like the typical standard that patentable
inventions be nonobvious 157 (or have sufficient inventive step 158 ). However, it has been
argued that India’s system seeks to go further by excluding so-called “me too” drugs or
“evergreening” – extending the basic pharmaceutical protection with less innovative
modifications that keep the drug under proprietary control for a longer period of time. 159
To the extent that this precludes protection for legitimate inventions, branded drug
companies are concerned.
¶44
A recent dispute that elucidates this point concerned the anti-cancer drug Gleevec,
produced by Novartis. 160 In 2005, India’s patent office denied a patent on the
pharmaceutical compound, stating that it was not sufficiently inventive over previous
iterations of the chemical, and Novartis appealed. 161 Novartis argued that the exception
to patent protection in the new Indian statute is a blatant attempt to deny protection to a
very common class of drugs—those that make viable treatments by improving on less
useful compounds—in favor of permitting early generic competition. 162 According to
Novartis, this violated TRIPS guarantees. 163 In August, 2007, this contentious battle
concluded with the somewhat uneventful decision that the Indian courts had no

China and India, intellectual property rights advocates remain concerned about haphazard enforcement.”).
153
See, e.g.,Walt Bogdanich & Jake Hooker, From China to Panama, a Trail of Poisoned Medicine,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, at 1.1; Geoff Dyer, Chinese Students ‘Copied Tamiflu’, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 31,
2007, at 2.
154
See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer, Drug Piracy: A Wave of Counterfeit Medicines Washes Over Russia,
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 5, 2006, at C.1.
155
See, e.g., Laurie Goering, Contraceptive Pill Scam Shakes Brazil, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jul. 19, 1998, at
A.27.
156
Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India), section 3(d) (prohibiting
a new form of a known substance from being patented unless this new form has considerably better
accuracy).
157
See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
158
The phrase “inventive step” as used in Europe and Japan is equivalent to the U.S. “obviousness”
requirement. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 56, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254,
273, at art. 56. (“An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the
state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”); David J. Abraham, Shinpo-Sei: Japanese
Inventive Step Meets U.S. Non-Obviousness, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 528, 529–30 (1995)
159
Tatum Andersen, Rejected Novartis Cases Leave India’s TRIPS Compliance Unchallenged, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH, Aug. 7, 2007, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=712&res=1024_( “[Section
3(d) was drafted with the prevention of a particular practice in mind: evergreening, where pharmaceutical
companies patent frivolous changes to their drugs in order to extend patent protection, thereby preventing
generic companies from manufacturing cheaper drugs the poor can better afford.”).
160
Id.
161
Affidavit filed on Behalf of Petitioner, Novartis AG v. Union of India, W.P.No.24759 (Madras H.C.
May 17, 2006) [hereinafter Novartis Affidavit], available at
http://www.lawyerscollective.org/%5Eamtc/%5EPatent_Oppositions/W.P.NO.24759.doc.
162
Id. at 17-20; Novartis Press Release, Improving Indian Patent Law Benefits Patients and Societies
(created Jun. 12, 2007), available at http://www.novartis.com/downloads/about-novartis/Novartis_positionGlivec_Gleevec_patent_case_india.pdf
163
Novartis Affidavit, supra note 161, at 17-19.
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jurisdiction to assess what is essentially an international trade dispute.164 Given the Swiss
government’s reluctance to take the dispute to the WTO on behalf of Novartis, 165 it is
likely that India will remain to have a diminished forum for pharmaceutical patents for
quite some time. 166
¶45
In contrast is the Chinese patent office’s decision in 2004 to deny protection on the
core compounds for Pfizer’s blockbuster drug, Viagra. 167 Given the success in
convincing various patent offices across the world of Viagra’s patentability, Pfizer
publicly accused the Chinese government of reneging on its promise to provide
substantial protection to pharmaceuticals (particularly those owned by foreign firms) in
compliance with TRIPS. 168 Many viewed the dispute as a test of China’s dedication to
intellectual property compliance. 169 In the end, a Chinese appellate court reversed the
decision of the patent office in 2006 and granted the protection Pfizer sought. 170
C. Exceptions and Negotiation advantages
¶46

The intellectual property future of the BRICs is certainly told in the first chapter by
the rights accorded and the enforcement thereof. This is indeed important and has rightly
received the most attention as a critical first step. However, there is a second chapter that
may be more meaningful for qualifying the conditions of the future BRIC relationship
with developed countries. This is a chapter that concerns official TRIPS-sanctioned
exemptions permitted to rights enforcement—instances in which patent rights may
legitimately be ignored or relaxed—creating an impact that is both political and
economic. It may be possible for the BRIC nations to adopt an approach to these
flexibilities that is predictable, yet different than developed countries, providing the
optimal benefit to the citizens of these respective nations.
The context of
pharmaceuticals provides an early highlight of the power and effect of such an approach
that should translate into other fields.
¶47
While there are a variety of possible enforcement nuances created by legislatures
(as well as courts in the case of common law countries like India 171 ), the most important
limitation on private rights is the ability of the government to appropriate for public use.

164

Novartis AG v. Union of India, W.P. Nos. 24759 and 24760 (Madras H.C. Aug. 6, 2007), available
at http://www.lawyerscollective.org/%5Eamtc/current_issues/Judgement.pdf.
165
See Andersen, supra note 159 (noting that the Swiss government signed an intellectual property
“memorandum of understanding” with the Indian government on August 7, suggesting alternate means of
resolving TRIPS-oriented disputes).
166
It is possible that India’s local pharmaceutical companies my challenge the provision at some point
in the future, as they have become prominent innovators in the pharmaceutical arts. See Financial Insight:
Subtle Win in Patent Loss, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2007, at C.14.
167
Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Reports China has Lifted its Viagra Patent, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2004, at C.1.
168
Andrews, supra note 142, at 1-2; Yu, supra note 108, at 988-89.
169
See, e.g., James Kynge, China Overturns Viagra Patent, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 8, 2004, at 27; Ken
Howard, Patent Fights Rumble in China, 3 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 988, 988 (2004). According
to one report, after six month on the market, 90% of the Viagra sold in Shanghi was fake. Pfizer Wins
Chinese Viagra Ruling, BBC NEWS, Jun. 5, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5047640.stm
170
Nicholas Zamiska, Bejing Court Backs Patent Protection for Viagra, WALL ST. J., Jun. 3, 2006 at
A.3.
171
India might be more accurately described as “mixed common law,” because it incorporates other
legal traditions. See Wayne R. Barnes, Contemplating a Civil Law Paradigm for a Future International
Commercial Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 677, 684 (2005). But it is clearly not a civil law country.
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Such appropriations are usually referred to as compulsory licenses because monetary
compensation in exchange for the use is proffered. 172 The TRIPS agreement actually
requires “adequate remuneration,” 173 though this term is ambiguous to say the least.174
This compulsory license appropriation theoretically could take the form of an ex ante
exception that permits a government the right to automatically use a right, but this
appears to be prohibited in the patent context 175 by the TRIPS requirement that
“authorization . . . be considered on the individual merits.” 176 More relevant is the ex
post compulsory license, a post-invention determination to relax property rights for some
overarching purpose. Historic examples have included licenses for military use, public
works, the development of local industry, and public health. 177
¶48
All the BRIC countries have compulsory license statutes. Moreover, despite the
difference in historical development of intellectual property rights, the BRICs have
surprisingly similar exemptions. This likely stems from the fact that such rights have
been retained by most industrialized nations for over 100 years178 —not to mention
enshrined in the historic 1898 Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual
Property 179 —and the BRIC statutes and policies are simply derivative of what other
nations have generally agreed upon. More broadly, compulsory license rights can be
viewed as one aspect of a government’s sovereign power over property rights within its
domain, 180 making the existence of such powers in the BRICs as well as most other
nations unsurprising.
172

Daniel R. Cahoy, Confronting Myths and Myopia on the Road from Doha, 42 GA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=989817, at p. 10.
173
TRIPS, supra note 127, at art. 31(h)
174
See generally Cahoy, supra note 172.
175
Interestingly, ex ante compulsory licenses do exist prominently in other contexts. For example, in
United States copyright law, there is an automatic compulsory license for making and distributing
phonorecords. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).
176
TRIPS, supra note 127, at art. 31(a).
177
Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Liceinsing of Patented Inventions,
UNCTAD-ICTSD Issue Paper No. 5 (2004), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/CS_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf.
For a consideration of examples in the United States, see Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side
Effects of Cipro®: A Reevaluation of Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40
AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 135-36 (2002).
178
Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for
Developing Countries, South Centre, at Part II (1999),
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/complicence/toc.htm (stating that compulsory licensing exist in
various forms in the patent laws of approximately one hundred countries and dates back to the English
Statue of Monopolies in 1623).
179
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6295, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention],
at art. 5(a).
180
This could be analogous to eminent domain power in the United States, which is generally
understood to underlie the statutory compensation mechanism. See Cahoy, supra note 177, at 142-151
(describing the ambiguity in treating 28 U.S.C. § 1498 as an eminent domain jurisdictional statute – the
“eminent domain theory” – versus an exception to the patent grant – the “established statutory theory.”).
However, the recent Federal Circuit case of Zoltek Corp. v. U.S., 442 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(citing Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894), casts some doubt on this notion, ruling tha § 1498
was not based on eminent domain because the Supreme Court had previously ruled that government
infringement and eminent domain are different acts.. Many countries appear to treat compulsory license
compensation as something less than the full taking of a tangible property right. See Cahoy, supra note
172, at p. 35-36. At least one author has argued that this view may be inconsistent with the obligations
attendant to bilateral investment treaties. Carlos M. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free
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The component available in all the BRIC compulsory licensing statutes is the
provision for government use in times of national emergency. 181 This would certainly
include health care crises, but it could also encompass other subjects of national
importance such as anti-terrorism initiatives. Additionally, India, Brazil and Russia have
what might be termed “local working” provisions, meaning that failure to manufacture a
patented article locally may lead to the imposition of a license. 182 Similarly, India, China
and Russia permit private parties to request a license to exploit the patent right following
the failure of negotiation with the patent owner, regardless of evidence of local
working. 183
Table 1: Comparison of BRIC Compulsory License Statutes
National
Emergency

Brazil
Russia
India
China
¶50

X
X
X
X

Local
Working

X
X 184
X

Failure of
Negotiation

Price or
Needs of
Market

Article
31bis
Exports

Dependant
on other
Patents

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

Perhaps the most significant compulsory license use by BRIC countries will come
not from supplying the home market, but rather from exporting pharmaceuticals to
developing or least-developed countries that have taken out licenses. As noted above,
India, China and Brazil each have significant pharmaceutical manufacturing sectors and

Trade Agreements: Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 331, 34851 (2004).
181
Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O., 15/05/1996 (93, 1): 8353, 15.05.1996 (Brazil),
translation available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/brazil1.html, at art. 71; Patent Law (adopted at
the 4th Meeting of the Standing Comm. Nat’l Pepole’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Sept. 4, 1992,
amended again Aug. 25, 2000 (P.R.C.), translation available at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/200203/t20020327_33872.htm, at art. 49;
Patentnyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Patent Law of the Russian Federation] No. 3517-1, Sept. 23, 1992,
42 VSND i VS RF No. 42, item 2139 (1992), amended by Federal Law No. 22-FZ, Feb. 7, 2003 (Russia),
translation available at http://www.fips.ru/ruptoen2/law/patent_law.htm, at art. 11; Patents (Amendment)
Act, 2002, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India), at sect. 92.
182
Lei No. 9.279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, D.O., 15/05/1996 (93, 1): 8353, 15.05.1996 (Brazil),
translation available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/brazil1.html, at art. 68; Patentnyi Zakon
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Patent Law of the Russian Federation] No. 3517-1, Sept. 23, 1992, 42 VSND i VS
RF No. 42, item 2139 (1992), amended by Federal Law No. 22-FZ, Feb. 7, 2003(Russia), translation
available at http://www.fips.ru/ruptoen2/law/patent_law.htm, at art. 10; Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002,
No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India), at sect. 92.
183
Patent Law (adopted at the 4th Meeting of the Standing Comm. Nat’l Pepole’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984,
amended Sept. 4, 1992, amended again Aug. 25, 2000 (P.R.C.), translation available at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/200203/t20020327_33872.htm, at art. 48;
Patentnyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Patent Law of the Russian Federation] No. 3517-1, Sept. 23, 1992,
42 VSND i VS RF No. 42, item 2139 (1992), amended by Federal Law No. 22-FZ, Feb. 7, 2003, (Russia),
translation available at http://www.fips.ru/ruptoen2/law/patent_law.htm, at art. 10; Patents (Amendment)
Act, 2002, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India), at sect. 91.
184
The Russian license to enable local working can be first imposed four years after the patent grant.
Patentnyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Patent Law of the Russian Federation] No. 3517-1, Sept. 23, 1992,
42 VSND i VS RF No. 42, item 2139 (1992), amended by Federal Law No. 22-FZ, Feb. 7, 2003, (Russia),
translation available at http://www.fips.ru/ruptoen2/law/patent_law.htm, at art. 11.
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are accomplished at producing generic medications. It is entirely reasonable that if the
rarely-used TRIPS article 31bis becomes more widely applied, 185 these BRIC members
have a good opportunity to become significant players. Notably, nothing in article 31bis
suggests that companies located in exporting members should not have the ability to
make a profit. As long as the final price of the generic pharmaceutical is sufficiently
advantageous in view of additional costs and royalties to patent owners, a significant
profit margin may be possible. 186
¶51
Despite the similarities in compulsory licensing provisions, there is a significant
divergence in how those flexibilities have been historically utilized in the BRICs. The
differences serve as an outline of relative intellectual property development, and may
provide a metric for future evaluation. More importantly, it is possible that one path will
provide the paradigm for the other BRICs seeking a balance between rights and access.
¶52
By far the most extreme use of compulsory licenses has come from Brazil. In
recent years, Brazil has threatened to impose compulsory licenses for AIDS medicines,
only to pull back at the last minute after achieving negotiation victory. 187 However, in
May of 2007, Brazil finally issued a patent compulsory license after failing to achieve the
desired price on the drug, Efavirenz. 188 It is likely that the move was at least partially
sparked by the desire to obtain the same price Thailand secured following its successful
issuance of several compulsory licenses for AIDS and heart drugs. 189 As noted above,
Brazil clearly intends to aggressively push the envelope on property rights flexibilities.190
However, that posture has generated a lot of controversy. 191 As a result, it is possible that
Brazil may lose some foreign direct investment opportunities and face other multinational
“sanctions” for its behavior. 192 While the costs may currently be outweighed by the
benefits of access to IP, it is possible that companies’ desire to punish Brazil will become
a more important obstacle in the future.

185
See Cahoy, supra note 172, at 17-21 (noting that recent international agreements have paved the way
to increased compulsory licensing).
186
Id. at 15-17.
187
Yu, supra note 137, at 846-47.
188
Concede licenciamento compulsório, por interesse público, de patentes referentes ao Efavirenz para
fins de uso público nãocomercial. Decreto No. 6.108, de 4 de Maio de 2007, D.O.U. de 07.04.2007 (Brazil)
189
See Andrew Jack & Richard Lapper, Brazil Spurns Patent on HIV Drug, FIN. TIMES, May 5, 2007, at
9 (“Talks broke down earlier in the week between the authorities and Merck, which resisted Brazil's calls to
reduce its price from Dollars 1.57 a patient a day to the 65 cents at which it is sold to Thailand.”).
190
See supra notes 52-73, and accompanying text.
191
Not surprisingly, the outcry against Brazil’s license has come from the pharmaceutical industry and
property rights advocates. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, AIDS Drugs: Are Property Rights and Human
Rights in Conflict, FT.COM, May 7, 2007 at 1 (“[D]ecisions like those in Brazil and Thailand cripple
incentives to invest in new drugs, particularly for AIDS, for which sick people worldwide will pay the price
tomorrow.”). In favor of Brazil’s actions have been several NGOs that promote access to medicines in
developing countries. See, e.g., Essential Action, Brazil Decides to be Held Hostage No More (May 4,
2007), available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2007-May/011110.html (“Brazil's initiative
is a crucial step to help the country maintain its effective program to treat people with HIV/AIDS, the
viability of which is threatened by high brand-name prices for second-generation drugs.”).
192
See, e.g., Merck & Co., Press Release, Statement on Brazilian Government’s Decision to Issue
Compulsory License for Stocrin (May 4, 2007), available at
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press_releases/corporate/2007_0504.html (“This decision by the GOB
will have a negative impact on Brazil's reputation as an industrialized country seeking to attract inward
investment, and thus its ability to build world-class research and development.”).
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Although India has not had a history of compulsory licensing in goods covered by
patent rights, it has prominently set out to act as the low-cost drugstore to the developing
world. The most significant move in this regard is India’s enactment of a provision to
permit pharmaceutical exports to countries that have enacted article 31bis compulsory
licenses. 193 Moreover, when issues have arisen about the global availability of generic
versions of essential medicines, Indian companies have publicly stood out as primary
providers. 194
¶54
On the other end of the spectrum is Russia. It has been largely absent in the
compulsory licensing game to date and pharmaceutical patent rights are not a prominent
topic of discussion. There are no reports of such licenses in any field, and Russia has not
set itself up as an exporter of licensed, patented goods. 195 One reason for the lack of
compulsory license activity may be the relative weakness of intellectual property rules in
Russia coupled with the fact that the WTO does not act as a strengthening force (because
Russia is not yet a member). 196 It appears that Russia’s position may be due to the
extreme ground it must cover in developing rights, but one would expect it will face the
same issues as the other BRIC countries very soon.
¶55
And then there is China. The country has also made very public gestures to
establish itself as an intellectual property proponent rather than a free rider. 197 It has
never granted a compulsory license. 198 On the other hand, it clearly intends to be a player
in the generic medicines trade. Most prominently, China publicly agreed to refrain from
using the provisions of TRIPS article 31bis to import pharmaceuticals, the only BRIC to
do so. 199 The country appears to be working toward a quiet balance of investment
incentives and flexibilities. Because China retains options but no longer openly
provokes, it may attract foreign investment while serving its particular interests as a
developing nation. This model of intellectual property balance may present the best
articulation for the future of the BRICs.

193

Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005 (India), at sect. 92A.
See Andrew Jack & Khozem Merchant, Indian Drugs Groups in Talks to Provide Generic Copies of
Tamifllu, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at 3 (describing the quick response of Indian drug companies to the
possible need for generic copies of Tamiflu in the wake of a bird flu epidemic); David W. Opderbeck,
Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game, 58 VAND. L. REV. 501, 522-25 (2005)
195
Knowledge Ecology International (“KEI”) keeps a fairly accurate list of countries that have enacted
legislation to enable article 31bis compulsory licenses. See KEI, Legislation to Allow for the Export of
Pharmaceuticals Produced Under Compulsory License, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cl-exportlegislation.html (last visited Sep. 21, 2007).
196
WTO, Accessions: Russian Federation, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm
(last visited Sep. 21, 2007) (describing negotiations on the Russian Federation’s accession to the WTO).
But see Frances Williams, Ukraine Ahead of Russia in WTO Entry Bid, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2007, at 2
(noting that Russia has a chance of joining the WTO by the end of 2007).
197
Massey, supra note 145, at 236 (“[C]entral government leaders and their policies no longer ignore or
promote the infringement of intellectual property.”); Yu, supra note 108, at 906-922 (detailing the dramatic
changes China has made in its intellectual property laws since accession into the WTO).
198
Eu Jin Chua, The Laws of the People’s Republic of China: An Introduction for International
Investors, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 133, 152 (2006).
199
WTO, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS (Sep. 2006), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/TRIPS_e/public_health_faq_e.htm.
194
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D. Toward a BRIC Model of IP Protection for Developing Countries
¶56

In view of the economic power of the BRICs, the need to develop innovative
industries, and the serious health issues faced by the population of each, it seems fairly
obvious that neither extreme of the existing intellectual property rights model fits
perfectly. The BRICs have good reason for agreeing to strengthen rights to a degree, but
also have a great need to limit the intellectual property power envisioned by the Western
paradigm. And they pack the power to resist capitulation that is not in their interest. The
relative similarities of these key aspects of BRIC industrial development suggest that a
hybrid model of intellectual property protection may serve them best.
¶57
What are the key aspects of the BRIC hybrid intellectual property model? In
essence, it must include provisions and negotiation tactics that demonstrate an overall
respect for intellectual property, while maintaining the ability to act in the social interest
of their respective populations. It should generally eschew blatant free riding or
protectionism, while publicly declaring the right to subrogate rights in times of crisis. It
may end up being closely aligned to China’s current strategy. In any case, the essential
points can be articulated rather simply: (1) respect for rights and the development of
dependable institutions; (2) exploitation of TRIPS flexibilities when public health goals
can be impacted; and (3) exploitation of TRIPS flexibilities to cement bargaining power
with foreign firms. As important as these broad principles, however, is to ensure that the
BRIC transnational intellectual property posture is no longer an ad hoc process, but the
result of serious academic and political deliberation to achieve a truly balanced
perspective. The deliberation must entail an understanding of what flexibilities are
necessary, ensuring they are adequately preserved, and providing strong intellectual
property protection in all other circumstances.
¶58
As a first step toward solidifying this model, the BRIC countries must engage in
serious investigation to determine what kind of cost-cutting will actually further the goals
of public health. If the desire is to increase access, lower prices do not always guarantee
more users. For example, when Brazil introduced its generic pharmaceutical regime in
1999, the expectation was that lower-priced generics would necessarily filter down to
populations that could not previously afford the medications. 200 But data demonstrates
that this often did not occur, with prescription rates after the introduction of generics
remaining stable. 201 In reality, the same population simply switched to lower-priced
drugs, shifting the income away from branded pharmaceutical companies but leaving
access essentially the same. 202 Utilizing a TRIPS flexibility to serve a public health goal
should include the understanding of whether the population lacking the drug is without
access for reasons other than simple economics.
¶59
Second, the BRICs must work to ensure that intellectual property flexibilities
remain. Perhaps the greatest threat to the BRIC’s desire to maintain control over the
intellectual property balance is the use of so-called “TRIPS-plus” trade agreements by
200
Generic Drugs in Brazil Are a Hard Pill for Big Pharma to Swallow, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON,
Mar. 10, 2006, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1338.
201
Id. (“[W]e are selling exactly the same volume we sold before generics [came on the market]. What
happened was that middle-class buyers bought generic products instead of branded products.”) (quoting
Jorge Raimundo, president of Interfarma, a Brazilian association representing global pharmaceutical
companies).
202
Id.
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industrialized countries. 203 In such agreements, a developing nation agrees to give up
some of the flexibilities it has under TRIPS in order to gain some other trade
advantages. 204 While it would be somewhat paternalistic to suggest that the BRIC
nations should not have the ability to determine what form of agreement best serves their
interests, it is fair to say that TRIPS-plus provisions reduce the ability to address future
uncertainties. The full consequences of the agreement may not be available to either
party for many years. This is likely one reason that the European Union has recently
indicated that it will no longer seek TRIPS-plus provisions in trade agreements. 205 It
appears that it would be wise for BRIC nations to avoid them as well, and consider
whether an alternative arrangement could provide the same advantages. For example, to
the extent that TRIPS-plus provisions are inserted under the threat of reduced foreign
direct investment, the impact may be blunted or avoided by collective action on the part
of developing countries to make use of TRIPS flexibilities. 206
III. CONCLUSION
¶60

Although much has been written about the BRICs separately, especially India and
China, there is little scholarship examining the BRIC nations as an emerging collective.
The influence of the BRICs shall likely be felt on a variety of ways, including political,
military, and socio-cultural effects. One arena where controversy and conflict is
inevitable is in the defense of administration of intellectual property rights, the topic of
this symposium.
¶61
In spite of having diverse histories, the BRIC economies are receiving roughly
similar treatment from the wealthiest nations. Either through coercion or negotiation, the
BRICs are being pressured to adopt a Western concept of intellectual property protection.
That means formal titling of inventive works, enforcement through statutory regimes, and
the inevitable demand for even greater protection as the diffusion of technology enables
cheaper and more effective methods of pirating products.
¶62
These pressures come at a price. Like many nations in the developing world,
citizens of the BRIC economies are badly in need of medicines invented and sold by the
very multi-national organizations pressing for strong protection. Whereas restrictions on
cell phone technology or Harry Potter books are rarely fatal, controls of any sort on antiretroviral drugs and other medicines can cost thousands of lives. The debate over

203

Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in RTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
(Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006); Carsten Fink & Patrick
Reichenmiller, Tightening TRIPS: The Intellectual Property Provisions of Recent US Free Trade
Agreements (2005), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/trade/worldbank02072005.pdf.
204
Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 323, 392-400 (2004) (discussing the move to bilateral trade agreements as a response to
resistance to multilateralism).
205
European Parliament Press Release, More Measures Needed on Access to Medicines Says EP
Resolution (Jul. 7, 2007), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/026-9059-190-07-28903-20070710IPR09047-09-07-2007-2007-false/default_en.htm (“The resolution calls on the Council to
restrict the mandate to the Commission in order not to negotiate pharmaceutical-related TRIPS-plus
provisions affecting public health and access to medicines . …”).
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See generally, Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign
Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming, 2008) (on file with
authors).
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pharmaceutical protections has thus become the touchstone for broader economic and
social issues that divide the developing from the developed nations.
¶63
The BRIC nations may not be the poorest countries in the world, but can plausibly
act as their proxy in the world stage. Brazilian shaping of global public opinion muted
U.S. pressure to more stringently enforce patent rights and no doubt other nations will
follow Brazil’s lead. China and Russia show how economic and political power
respectively can change the negotiating posture of the United States. Skillful procedural
wrangling by Indian legislators shows how very long it takes for coercive pressure to
actually have an impact on improving national codes. The result is the BRICs have all
found their own way in preserving at least some legal sovereignty in the intellectual
property arena. These paths, taken together, may provide a model for other middledeveloped countries that hope a better balance between intellectual property rights and
national economic and social interests.
¶64
It seems almost too obvious to state that Western interests will have to work with
and not brush aside the wishes of BRIC nations in shaping a global intellectual property
regime. The public demand for and the psychological satisfaction of public coercion will
not easily fade, and it is only matter of time before the United States or the European
Union becomes embroiled in another adversarial controversy over patents, trademarks, or
copyrights. The accuracy of the predictions of Goldman Sachs will be the ultimate
measure of whether the BRICs emerge as a robust economic force or remain emerging
players by the year 2050.
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